The article evaluates the extent to which policies aimed at combating disinformation are morally justified in a democratic society. It argues that using the prevailing Just War Theory as a normative framework to address the morality of counter-disinformation policies leads to morally counterintuitive consequences, such as condoning extremely aggressive approaches. Firstly, an evaluation of the counter-disinformation policies identified in the literature is conducted, placing them on a scale from “soft” to “hard” policies. Then, the article compares Just War Theory and deliberative democracy and claims that the former suffers from an ingrained bias in favor of the security of the state as the referent object of security. Deliberative democracy is, according to the article, a more useful normative framework, given that it is more attuned to the values of contemporary democratic societies and places deliberation at the key value. Finally, through a comparison of the results of normative evaluations of counter-disinformation policies between deliberative democracy and Just War Theory, the article argues in favor of the former.
Keywords: deliberative democracy, Just War Theory, disinformation, ethics