The factor of the war in Ukraine concretized the whole range of problems of the cultural and semantic space as a field of security for one’s own identity. Therefore, the formation and strengthening of a common cultural and semantic space among all layers of Ukrainian society as a security value objectifies the relevance of various spheres precisely in terms of the quality of their functionality: education and science, culture and art, as well as religion. Since these spheres correct the behavioral features of the mass consciousness and are responsible for the processes of regulating self-identification, they are also used as means of manipulation and destabilization in the military-political confrontation. Their specificity in undermining social stability and security has already been determined by a large number of special intelligences on the subject of “hybrid war”. Thus, considering this way of “fighting” – hybrid war, the researchers point to the change in conflict models after the end of the Cold War and with the beginning of globalization: deviation from the traditional conflict formula inherent in the Westphalian system, which means the emergence of a new type of organized force that carries out its activities internally of states. The concept of new wars and their asymmetry appears (Münkler 2002). An important feature of these conflicts is the extreme complexity and blurring of former distinctions between war as a form of force in interstate relations, organized crime, and large-scale violations of human rights (Копійка, Дорошко & Балюк 2018, 10). Therefore, the essential feature of new type wars, that is, modern wars, is complexity, and hence hybridity.
“They also include the presence of the media, which can turn the conflict into a show that will be watched by hundreds of thousands of television viewers around the world in real time mode. They also involve humanitarian organizations from almost all over the world, other non-governmental organizations, arms sellers and […] mercenaries, military advisers and possible volunteers from the diaspora. So these conflicts are local, but at the same time global” (Копійка, Дорошко & Балюк 2018, 11).
In attempts to clearly define hybridity, there was a plurality of answers. In the literature on this issue, attention is mostly focused on describing the elements of a hybrid war: who is involved in the confrontation and what its course is. Despite this, the key criteria for understanding this phenomenon are distinguished: according to the method (traditional, irregular) (Копійка, Дорошко & Балюк 2018, 19) of waging, according to the characteristics of subjectivity (state, private companies, etc.) (Münkler 2002, 57), according to the method (traditional and synergistic combination of all possible) of actions, according to the level of systematicity or aggregation of operating environment (Копійка, Дорошко & Балюк 2018, 19).
Therefore, hybridity is a deviation from certain norms, which combines various means to increase the effectiveness of actions due to the synergistic effect of this variety of forms of destruction, that is, this combination. Isn’t the main task of modern humanitarians to work precisely according to the methodological criterion, that is, to answer the question: which of the spheres of the spirit are combined? how is it done? what peculiarities are implemented? what to expect from it? Since religion appears as one of the key means of this synergistic effect (Мудраков 2022a, 10), a very colorful fan of descriptions of the role of religion in the processes of various forms of communication and relations arises: about the globality (return) of religion (Casanova 2019), about its role in the world politics and changes in the system of international relations (Єленський 2013), about the role in world politics and changes in the system of international relations, about the need for “international political theology” (Hatzopoulos & Petito 2003; Kubalkova 2003) and even about the military potential of religions (Zinser 2015). “In any case, religion is quite often considered in theories of international relations as “soft power”, and religious organizations – as actors of international relations, which in one way or another influence the configuration of world or regional politics” (Scott 2000).
Since the war in Ukraine revealed the urgency of increasing the constant analysis of the outlined direction and educational measures as a necessity to solve the complex problem of humanitarian security (= in the sense of preserving identity) (Мудраков 2022b, 317), as much as the thematic direction of this intelligence is determined by the analysis of one of the key means of this synergistic effect, which is responsible for the creation of the field of self-identification – church and religious life as a producer of the culture and tradition of the Ukrainian people, the affirmer of national self-awareness; the research is also determined by the revision of the motivational drivers of the activity of religious communities in relation to social stability and security (constructiveness/destructiveness) in general as one of the key trends in the features of international relations of the 21st century (defined by the Special Commission for the Definition of Religion in the International Relations of the United States) (Appleby & Cizik 2010). After all, the positional and operational aspect of the Orthodox churches in Ukraine not only reveals the problems of the historical retrospective of the relations between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples, but, above all, actualizes these relations in modern geopolitical development strategies and the security situation in the region and the world.
It is important to emphasize that the scientific discourse is still dominated by studies devoted not to the peace-making role of religion, but to the contrary. Special studies indicate that even at the end of the last century, with the growing dynamics such materials were five times more (Rapoport 1991). Therefore, the relevance of the description in the binary direction (constructiveness / destructiveness) is dictated not only by the research discourse, but also by real life, because “if we do not take into account the religious factor in the interconfessional relations of Ukraine, the main core of the confrontation in the religious environment of Ukraine is the question of their relationship to the national revival of our country and its place in this process” (Колодний 2019a, 23), – a summary from the leading research institution in Ukraine for the study of religion. Thus, the historical tradition of religious dynamics in Ukraine did not develop in favor of the “national church”, or, even more so, in favor of the state church (Колодний 2019b), but is characterized by pluralistic development. Modern Ukraine is religiously plural and this plurality is confirmed by the law, which guarantees equal rights to all and declares the prohibition of the state church of Ukraine (Закон України 1991). That is, this pluralism did not contribute to monopolization or at least to a certain structuring of activities in the processes of nation-building by various churches. Despite the habit of identifying the country exclusively with the Orthodox tradition, “Ukraine is not an Orthodox country, but a country dominated by the Orthodox religion” (Колодний 2019a, 20). Therefore, today, during the “war for identity”, it is vital to establish the parameters of the meaning of “Ukrainian” in the names of the churches Ukrainian Orthodox Church and Orthodox Church of Ukraine , following any activity of the dominant communities in the matter of national interests, all the more so if these churches represent the civilizational character of the confrontation (Ishchuk & Sagan 2020), which goes beyond the boundaries of modern history and concerns the interpretation of almost every event from the individual or joint past of Ukraine and Russia. Clear definition of belonging is a check of the “national passport of Orthodox churches” in Ukraine, on which today “national or state security” depends (Саган 2019a, 99).
The formulation “national passport” implies specific data and unambiguous positioning, therefore the research material is documents. Documented positions not only create “Documentary realities” (Atkinson & Coffey 2011, 78), but also reflect self-representation. According to Atkinson and Coffey, documents can be understood as representations of oneself or others, which, in turn, can become the object of research, that is, in our context, this representation is a reflection of identity, its qualitative characteristics.
Therefore, the purpose of the research is specified by the analysis of documented identity positions, which project the active existence of Orthodox churches in Ukraine – Orthodox Church of Ukraine and Ukrainian Orthodox Church – as a manifestation of social responsibility/ideological necessity during the Russian-Ukrainian war. Within this content, we have two objectives: (1) to establish and compare quantitative indicators – norms, definitions, positioning, characteristics – in accordance with the defined criteria of the “national passport of Orthodox churches of Ukraine”, as well as to determine the quantitative indicator of compliance with the criteria; and (2) to interpret the projection of norms and positions in documents and individual acts of activity as a factor in the establishment of the national identity during the war.
Methodological explanations and analysis criteria
The wording “national passport of Orthodox churches” in Ukraine structurally reflects the concept of “locality”: “under the influence of […] political-administrative interpretations, the concept of “locality” today is most often understood as the presence of a certain internal self-government or complete independence (autocephaly) of the Orthodox Church. However, speaking in the language of ecclesiology, the Church becomes local when a local community of Christians is created, which carried out the inculturation of the Gospel into a certain local religious tradition, into the national culture in general” (Саган 2019b, 12). That is, it is about political independence and cultural identity. However, if the concept of “locality” names the structure, then the concept of “national passport of Orthodox churches” specifies it, and even clearly indicates the criteria of this independence and identity. So, since it is about the need to determine and certify the fact of independence (concrete data) with the fact of authenticity (quality of identity), it is as much necessary to focus on methodological construction and symbiotic creativity that prove productivity and efficiency (Stahl 2010): since it is to some extent about the analysis of documents to study measurable behavior characteristics, so the research methodology should combine quantitative indicators and qualitative methods.
Within this context we should note the following: (1) Quantitative indicators reflect several norms, definitions, positionings and characteristics in the documents planned for analysis, which are limited to a chronological frame: from the beginning of the annexation of territories in Ukraine (2014) to today (2022). Their essential specificity leads to the task direction, which in Research on Science Education is called a comparison of the relative efficiency of ready-made concepts (Amin, Smith & Wiser 2014, 64-66), which in our study is transformed into a comparison of the relative efficiency of normative quality. Therefore, within the framework of this methodological vector, the task is to collect and compare a set of norms, definitions, positionings and characteristics such as the presence of the “national passport of the Ukrainian church”; (2) In general, “qualitative methods multiply as a result of differences in subject matter and procedures. In addition, the very course of research usually causes a change in existing methods and the creation of new ones” (Knoblauch 2013). In the end, it should be assumed that the multitude of qualitative methods and their dynamics can no longer be subjected to a systematic review by any single “expert on qualitative methods” (Clarke 2005). Therefore, when analyzing the national-identity features of Orthodox churches one cannot do without interpretation. That is, we are talking about the so-called “reduced concept of method” (Reduzierter Methodenbegriff) (Strübing et al. 2018, 87).
The analysis of documents on the subject of independence and by national identifier leads to the defining normative acts of the life of churches: (1) documents that determine the independence of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, its identity image, and therefore its activity outline – the tomos (ПЦУ 2019) on autocephaly and the statute (ПЦУ 2018). To analyze the subjectivity of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, let’s pay attention to the documents that are positioned as containing the same functional and defining tasks in the identity and activity projection: the Blessed Charter of His Holiness Patriarch Alexy dated October 27, 1990 and the statute on the management of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church , from May 27, 2022. Since certain norms and provisions of the Statute and the Charter of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church are determined by the Charter of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), this document should not be overlooked. (2) Other supporting documents will be used to confirm or refute the argumentation: meeting logs, appeals, resolutions, etc.
Taking into account the general theoretical and methodological guideline to formulate questions to documents as precisely and concretely as possible as a guarantee of clearer coverage of the essence of norms, positions, etc. (Krumm, Noetzel & Westle 2009; Mayring 2016; Hoffmann 2018), we specify the definition of independence and originality of Orthodox churches with specific criteria. In the selection of criteria that would make it possible to assess the activity specifics of Orthodox churches for the purpose of establishing (or harming) national identity, it is important to focus on researchers who, working according to different methodological approaches, agree on a set of criteria – A. Kolodny and O. Sahan. Undoubtedly, the orientation is determined by their studies of both the entire historical progress of religions in Ukraine (Колодний 1996; Колодний 1999), and Orthodoxy in particular (Саган 2021): the entire range of worldview-historical and socio-political factors of national-religious formation as such is taken into account. It is important to emphasize that both today’s authors and those who worked in this direction about 100 years ago agree on the quality of national-religious in Ukrainian Orthodoxy that existed before 1686 in the Kyiv Metropolitanate, that is, before its “annexation by Moscow church” (Ілларіон 1944).
It should be noted that Ukrainian Orthodoxy should not be identified with some nationalist bias in Orthodoxy, with what is called ethnophiletism. As O. Sahan writes: “the idea of Ukrainian Orthodoxy is a supranational value, because Kyiv is the place in history and culture where the universal and the national are in living and organic unity. The place where it is impossible to forget about the Hellenistic or Byzantine sources of our current religious culture” (Саган 2021, 130-131). Therefore, among the features of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, the combination and practical implementation of which make it a unique national and cultural phenomenon, canonicality, democratism, evangelization, and openness are defined (Колодний 2019b; Саган 2021). To the stated number of criteria, it would be methodologically justified to add the criterion of subjectivity through self-positioning. This set constitutes the proposed concept of the “national passport of Orthodox churches”. The presence of these traits, and most importantly their cultivation during the war not only shows the socially constructive/destructive attitudes of the churches, but also specifies church-religious means as an ideological toolkit in the hybrid Russian-Ukrainian war.
Analysis of documents and interpretation of their projection
(1) Subjectivity
Subjectivity is documented in various forms in church documents as a declaration of self-identity: both jurisdictional belonging and cultural identity. The tomos defines the subjectivity of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine as equal to all other local Churches, i.e. its full rights and self-government as an administrative part of the single Ecumenical Orthodox Church without the mediation of other churches: “we recognize and proclaim the Autocephalous Church established within the territory of Ukraine as our spiritual daughter and call on all the world Orthodox Churches to recognize her as a sister” (ПЦУ 2019). The first article of the Statute of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine echoes this: “The Orthodox Church of Ukraine is [...] inseparably united with the Mother Great Church of Christ in Constantinople and through her with all other Orthodox Autocephalous Churches” (ПЦУ 2018).
Another indicator of subjectivity is relayed by the possibility of conducting relations with various subjects at the international level. Thus, the head of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine has the right to freely represent the church (own cultural and traditional identity) among others, and the main thing is that the Orthodox Church of Ukraine gradually receives recognition of its independence and canonicality by other Orthodox churches, taking an equal place in the Diptych among 15 others. The tomos does not impose any obligations on the head of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine , apart from participation in the Pan-Orthodox life, i.e. in inter-Orthodox events (ПЦУ 2019). In particular, in structuring and organizing the life of dioceses, all rights belong to the Holy Synod of Bishops: “it establishes new dioceses and liquidates or unites old ones, and also determines the boundaries of Episcopal regions” (IV.7). Neither the regulatory documents of the Ecumenical Patriarchate nor any other churches provide any other clarifications regarding the ownership and functioning of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, and no documented ecclesiastical legal interventions or encroachments on the Orthodox Church of Ukraine have been recorded.
Before analyzing the Charter of His Holiness Patriarch Alexy II, let us pay attention to the fact that the document is personal, that is, it was addressed to the then Metropolitan Philaret of Kyiv on his own political initiative: “we bless through the real Charter our [...] to be from now on the Orthodox Ukrainian Church independent and self-reliant in its management, and to you, unanimously chosen [...] as its Primate”. Next we read: “The Ukrainian Orthodox Church, is united through our Russian Orthodox Church with the United Holy, Cathedral and Apostolic Church […]” (РПЦ 1990). We should not doubt that formal unity with the United Orthodox Church through the Russian Orthodox Church is possible, but this testifies rather against its subjectivity, since the declared independence is not reflected in the Diptych of independent Orthodox churches, that is, it is not recognized by all Orthodoxy as independent. Therefore, the new edition of the Statute of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church with the words “The Ukrainian Orthodox Church is independent and self-reliant in its management and organization in accordance with the Charter” (RISU 2022) confirms only a certain degree of independence, but not autocephaly, since with an emphasis on the fact that “the governing center of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is in Kyiv” (I.1) refers rather to some local dimensions of subjectivity.
Even in spite of the regulatory wording – “maintenance of inter-denominational and inter-religious relations in Ukraine and beyond” (IV.7.й) with the competence of the Synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church regarding international representation (RISU 2022) – which should confirm its subjectivity in relations with other churches, this the norm is undermined by the positioning of the Russian Orthodox Church. Among the latest facts of such positioning is the meeting of Local Orthodox Churches in Amman on February 26, 2020: “as part of the official delegation of the Russian Orthodox Church - His Beatitude Metropolitan Onufrii of Kyiv and All Ukraine” (ОВЦЗ 2020). To participate in delegations of the Russian Orthodox Church is the duty of the head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, who must also be present at all meetings of the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, and bishops, accordingly, undertake to be present at the events of Local and Hierarchical meetings (X.9). It turns out that the Russian positioning does not even take into account the regulatory and normative acts of the management of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, apparently guided by clause I.3 of the Statute of the Russian Orthodox Church, according to which “The jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church extends to persons of the Orthodox faith who live in the canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church: in the Russian Federation, Ukraine [...]”.That is, since the Russian Orthodox Church does not recognize the return of the Kyiv Metropolitanate to the Constantinople Patriarchate, as considers it an appendage of the Moscow Patriarchate, i.e. itself, because these names – Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church – are synonymous: “All autonomous and self-governing Churches that are part of the Russian Orthodox Church, [...] ] canonically constitute the Moscow Patriarchate” (I.2). So it is clear why there is no Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the Diptych compiled by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, but only the Russian Orthodox Church is indicated.
The norm of the Statute of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which refers to its independence in structuring and organizing the life of dioceses (VII.2; VII.3), is contradicted by the norm of the Statute of the Russian Orthodox Church (X.8) and the actions documented in the journal No. 59 of the Holy Synod of June 7, 2022. The Russian Orthodox Church on the redistribution of dioceses: it is about the creation of the Crimean diocese by Patriarch Kirill without any agreement with the leadership of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (РПЦ 2022a). This shows that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church does not own its own territories and is unable to influence the situation.
The meaning and projectability of norms is clarified by comparing them with documented functionality, that is, specific positionings. Thus, in paragraph 9 of the Decree on the circumstances of the war, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church does not see its Statute as problematic, but considers the Statute of the Orthodox Church of Ukrainian to be such: “to realize that their canonical status [...] is actually non-autocephalous and significantly inferior to the freedoms and opportunities in the implementation of church activities, which are provided for by the Statute on the administration of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church” (УПЦ 2022а). However, exclusively normative positions indicate the opposite.
Instead, in paragraph 3 the address of the Synod of Bishops of the Orthodox Church of Ukrainian to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, there is a call to “follow the tomos on autocephaly, in which it is determined that all dioceses, monasteries, parishes and other Orthodox church institutions should be under the jurisdiction of the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine”, as the only canonical and a fully independent entity. – “The existence of the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine, as well as any other method that provides for the existence of Orthodox church structures in our country separate from the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, is a canonical anomaly, a violation that must be corrected sooner or later (ПЦУ 2022b).
It is important to look at these documentary positionings through the prism of the theoretical and ethnic aspects of identity studies, because this will further expose the problem of subjectivity as the relationship of different confessional groups within one ethnic group and their conformity to this ethnic group. Here we turn to the work of Barth (1970; 1994) and Schäfer (2003; 2009) on the interaction of beliefs related to content and difference from other actors. It follows that the content disposition of the OCU and the UOC, which indicates the level of subjectivity, differs in the fullness of documentary certificates, and thus in the general rights to structure the church-network and free interreligious and interfaith interaction. Their functionality (positions presented in specific proposals), which is manifested through strategic visions, so far indicates the impossibility of joint projects and projects of unity as the emergence of a new joint jurisdictional independence and the establishment of cultural identity.
(2) Concilliar-legal
Concilliar-legal (canonicality) in the tradition of the Ukrainian church indicates the peculiarities of the organization of election processes at all levels of church and religious life, which was mutually determined by the secular element: electability, not appointment or absolute power, electoral councils, legitimacy of the laity. Peculiarities of activation of internal-regulatory and social-structural capabilities of churches objectify the level of “subjectivity” and “independence” in the methods of electing the head: in the Orthodox Church of Ukraine he is elected at the Local Council (X.10), that is, independently. This is autocephaly, that is, church self-leadership; in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church “The Council of Bishops elects the Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine and determines the procedure for his election” (ІІІ.8; V.2). However, the Statute of the Russian Orthodox Church stipulates that the candidacy must receive an additional “blessing” (X.5), the ecclesiastical consequences of which are not mentioned, that is, it can be interpreted by Moscow according to its own needs. That is, such a “blessing” is the final approval, without which the procedure of the election process cannot be completed. It turns out that this process has an exclusively demonstrative nature, because if the candidacy does not suit the Russian Orthodox Church, it simply will not approve it with a blessing even after the election.
This procedure is rooted in the history of relations between Kyivan and Moscow Orthodoxy. It has a very illustrative precedent, when there was an attempt to restore and preserve the principle of conciliarity by the Kyivan See, at least initially to get rid of the autocratic appointment of Moscow leaders to the highest church posts in the Ukrainian Orthodox territories. This refers to an attempt by Kyivan Orthodoxy to gain autocephaly about a hundred years ago (1917-1920) by appealing to the arbitration of Constantinople and the creation of the All-Ukrainian Church Council: “It [the church council – the authors] became a permanent body of the national church struggle. The Council declared itself a provisional government of the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Churches. It was decided to appoint administrators for various consistories of Ukrainian dioceses. The Church Council banned the departure of its chairman, Archbishop […], whom the Patriarch had summoned to Moscow to serve as governor, as it saw his appointment as a maneuver by the pro-Russian hierarchy to remove him” (Heyer 2003, 59). This fact indicates not only a desire to free themselves from external influence on the structuring and internal management of the church, but also an intention to change the conditions of their own church-religious identity, i.e., to restore its previous traditions. Two lines have survived to this day: the holding of the Unification Council (2018) was approved by the Ecumenical Patriarch based on the principles of concilliar-legal: the embodiment of the principle as the restoration of tradition. Bishops, priests, monks and lay people were invited and had the right to vote. Metropolitan Onufrii was also elected according to the specified procedure, receiving a blessing/confirmation from Patriarch Kirill (РПЦ 2014).
(3) Openness
The equality of the laity and the clergy in elections, the constantly updated composition of the clergy formed an open social state, an open system – openness. Openness contributed to free thinking, that is, the emergence of a large number of theologians and thinkers who studied in Western Europe, and a certain equality of ecclesiastical and secular elements in the Ukrainian church became a condition for the formation and long-term functioning of such a unique phenomenon as church brotherhoods, which in public life played a role of church, cultural and educational organizations, that is, they performed an educational and ideological function in the development of civil society based on the national idea (Міщенко 2016). Today, openness is also realized through the dialogue and the filling of tradition with new meanings, which for our context means that “openness” is both a process of self-discovery and a marker of self-awareness of Ukrainian Orthodoxy in the realities of the 21st century (Коваленко 2021, 52).
The first sign of openness is the participation of the laity in the election process of the superior: in the Orthodox Church of Ukraine it takes place with their mandatory participation (X.12), and in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church the election procedure takes place without the laity. In the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, lay people are involved in participation in the Local Council, that is, in the highest church authority (II.1), while in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, lay people can be included in the meetings of the Council “as needed” (II.2), and all their participation in regulatory issues of life of the church is defined only by the Diocesan Assembly (VII.29; VIII.31). In the end, the presence or absence of such a document as the Statute on the websites of these churches can be considered a criterion for the openness and communication of the church with society.
In addition to the availability and cooperation in intra-church affairs of the laity and the clergy, openness means openness to social processes, first of all for our context, to large-scale social upheavals. Such social-church interactions (dialogue between the church and society) indicate a common understanding of common priorities in the development of both the institutionality of the church and the state of citizenship of society. In this context, inter-church dialogue is an even more revealing factor. The position of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine is documented in the Appeal of the Synod of Bishops to the hierarchs, clergy and the faithful under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine with “a call to start an official dialogue without the declaration of previous preconditions” (ПЦУ 2022b), as well as in the Resolution of the Synod of Bishops “to reaffirm the desire and readiness of the Local Church to start a dialogue, the purpose of which is achieving the unity of Ukrainian Orthodoxy around the Kyiv throne on the basis of the tomos on autocephaly” (ПЦУ 2022c). The answer to such proposals was the item in the Resolution of the Council of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church about “deep regret in connection with the lack of unity in Ukrainian Orthodoxy. The existence of schism is perceived by the Cathedral as a deep painful wound on the church body. It is especially regrettable that the recent actions of the Patriarch of Constantinople in Ukraine, which resulted in the formation of the “Orthodox Church of Ukraine”, only deepened the misunderstanding and led to physical confrontation” (УПЦ 2022а).
In this regard, it is important to pay attention to the application of the principle of openness in the strategy of building the religious and church identity of the Russian Orthodox Church. “It [the Church – the authors] is not called Russian because of its ethnicity. Rather, this designation indicates that the Russian Orthodox Church carries out its pastoral mission among peoples who accept the Russian spiritual and cultural tradition as the basis of their national identity or a significant part of it. Therefore, in this sense, we also consider Moldova to be part of the 'Russian world'. At the same time, the Russian Church is the most multinational Orthodox community in the world and seeks to further develop its multinational character” (Кирил 2010, 30; РЦП 2010). R. Elsner defines this idea as a strategy of church “multinationality” and names such advantages (as an ideological basis) as openness to everyone, regardless of nationality, language, culture, and thus unification beyond institutional politics. In particular, this refers to the unity of the space that today, in addition to Russia, includes Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova (Elsner 2017, 206). But immediately afterwards in this study, the author questions the purity of the intention of these statements about openness, pointing to the special ideologization of the church since 2012 and its service to the “Russian World” ideology (in practice) as a desire to establish a single and separate civilizational historical space for the mentioned countries, originating from ancient Russia. That is, it is about instrumentalizing the church in Russia's foreign policy (Elsner 2017, 207-210).
In this way, the idea of Christian openness in the service of Russia's foreign policy forms the “Orthodox identity of the “Russian world””, i.e., it makes a political claim to the unified identity of this space. Therefore, any alternatives to openness pose a threat to this idea of a single civilization of the “Russian world”. Therefore, it is the task of all its church structures to protest such alternatives and fight against the implementation of these alternatives. In this way, openness as a principle seems to tolerate other religions, but leads to a clash of Orthodox identities.
(4) Democratism
Democratism of the church has always been adjusted by the state – a centuries-old tradition: “the Orthodox tradition has been dominated by the Byzantine legacy of a “symphony of powers” between the Church and the Empire, the patriarch and the Basilian (king). This doctrine, while recognizing the difference between politics and religion, the temporal and the spiritual, believes that these two powers are united, like divine and human nature in Christ, like soul and body” (Віллем 2006, 30). In other words, the style and regime of state governance is reflected by political connotations in the church's existence. Democratism in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was determined by the general tradition of the political culture of electability in general, intertwining with it, and conciliar rights in the church itself: the clergy in Ukraine did not become a special, closed stratum, they always took an active part in social and political affairs and, in turn, allowed the laity to participate in church affairs, and during divine services, priests, if there were several of them, had to stand in one row, and not put the elder in order ahead, and the Gospel was read facing the faithful and almost always with the altar door open.
Let us pay attention to the norms regarding the adoption of their own statutes by churches, which very well demonstrate their democracy. In its life activities, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church must be guided by the statute of the Russian Orthodox Church, in addition to its own statute, which must also be approved by the Patriarch of Moscow (X.3). At the same time, any changes to this document must be consistent with the statute of the Russian Orthodox Church, the Blessed Charter, and the definitions of the Bishops Council of the Russian Orthodox Church. All this is again under the visa of the Patriarch of Moscow. Besides the “decisions of the Local and Bishops Councils are binding for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church” (X.10). Despite all this, the Council of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church dated 05.27.2022 certifies exactly the opposite actions: significant changes to the Statute of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church without agreement (at least officially documented) with all the cited procedural regulations of the Statute of the Russian Orthodox Church.
Instead, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine can make changes to its Statute at the meeting of the Local Council, which must correspond to the spirit of the tomos. And in the case of unforeseen situations that are not regulated by the Statute, they (I.3) “are considered by the mixed Commission appointed by the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Autocephalous Church in Ukraine” (ПЦУ 2018), but all are equally approved by the Local Council. And the statute of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine provides the right to apply to the Mother Church for consultations: “on the most important issues that require joint discussions and actions, for the better support of the Orthodox Church, the Holy Synod of Bishops in Ukraine applies to the Ecumenical Patriarch, who willingly provides assistance and announces the necessary decision to the Holy Bishops Council of the Church of Ukraine” (IV.1.III).
The statute of the Russian Orthodox Church does not grant the Ukrainian Church the right to create its own institutions abroad (parishes, representative offices, missions, etc.). Such a right is recognized only by the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church (XIX.4), that is, this norm turns the Ukrainian Orthodox Church into a self-contained structure without the right to social and spiritual support of its own flock at a distance. However, in paragraph 8 of the Resolution, the Council of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church clearly stated its intention to open parishes abroad for Ukrainian refugees (УПЦ 2022а).
Updates to the UOC's statute can be interpreted as attempts to demonstrate its own democratism, which is in line with the spirit of the political culture of the people of Ukraine, i.e. its specific identity, and comes exclusively from its own church hierarchy. However, this framework of democratism can also be interpreted as a political action of the Russian Orthodox Church, as the UOC is not recognized as autocephalous by either world Orthodoxy or the ROC and is considered a space of the Moscow Patriarchate. The norms of the ROC Statute demonstrate its decisive influence on the UOC, i.e., the direct influence of the political culture and the regime in power on the formation of the mental space and the peculiarities of the political affiliation of the UOC believers according to the ideological guidelines of the ROC tradition remains. “This tradition, the influence of which has not ceased [...] in Russia, where it seems that there is still no readiness to accept the separation of church and state according to the Western model, often manifested itself in the interpenetration of church and state (as evidenced by the so-called Sergianism in Russia after the 1917 revolution and the information now revealed about the close ties between the communist authorities and the Orthodox hierarchy). [...]. The opening of the Russian space to the winds of democracy [...] poses a formidable challenge to the Orthodox Church” (Віллем 2006, 31).
Finally, because of the national conservative worldview, the church should not be expected to promote the democratization of the state and society, as this touches on security issues (Malek 2011). This security thesis is well reflected in the trends in the creation of chaplaincy services in Ukraine during the war: there is support from the OCU leadership and the authorities for the free choice of priests to move from ordinary parishes to military clergy (chaplaincy). For the UOC, this option is closed.
(5) Evangelization
Evangelization as a criterion for the identity of national aspirations is, above all, the regulation of the internal life of the church based on the interpretation of the primary and secondary canons of the church and their incorporation into the local culture, and not the fulfilment of political orders of the secular authorities (observance of the New Testament principle “God’s is to God, but Caesar’s is to Caesar”, that is, the church’s rejection of Caesaropapism and the formation of such a canonical system as independence from secular power) and, of course, the politicization of sermons and other forms of communication and the delivery of the Gospel. The fact of the presence of state power in the life of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine is recorded in the tomos: “since the pious and God-protected land of Ukraine has been strengthened and magnified by the highest craft and received its full political independence, its state and church leaders have been fervently asking for its church self-government and side by side for thirty years with the people and in unison with their ancient requests, once addressed to the Holy Apostolic See of Constantinople” (ПЦУ 2019).
However, not all such cases of autocephalous movements in history are full of such state initiatives, that is, it is rather an act that testifies to the awareness of the ability of Christian values to unite for the sake of the common future. It is another matter when manipulation and destructive actions are hidden behind these values: as the Russian Orthodox Church, in its positions on the blessing of the war in Ukraine (РПЦ 2022b), has turned from a hierarchical-structural governing body into a purely political factor of influence in a hybrid war, so is the Ukrainian Orthodox Church as a subordinate entity, despite the emphasis in the Statute, that “the governing center is in Kyiv” (ROC X.4) (UOC I.1), forces us to analyze the content of their evangelization. After all, as O. Sahan emphasizes, “spiritual subordination is always a decisive factor in the political dependence of the state and the instability of the development of society, which is confirmed by the history of the relationship between secular authorities and Orthodox churches” (Саган 2019b, 9). This idea was described by K. Hovorun as a certain dynamic of the development of the tradition of identifying self-determination in three stages of the church's alliance with the Russian authorities: tsarist, Soviet, and post-Soviet. He points out how, in the latter stage, the church directly contributed to Russian aggression against Ukraine (Hovorun 2018, 47-88) and emphasizes that each ideology «reduce Christianity if the church incorporates them into its own teaching» (Ibid., 115). The author emphasizes the negative aspects of the idea of creating or restoring a (old)-new civilizational identity with the support of the church – the repressive nature of the imperial model. He specifies that the Russian version of civilizational nationalism, supported by bishops and clergy, is behind Russian military invasions and information warfare around the world (Ibid., 147-177).
This maxim was problematized by patriarch Kirill’s ethnophilicism and ideologization in the report of the head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Epiphanius at the extended meeting of the Synod of Bishops: “There is no doubt that the Moscow Patriarchate and its head are fully included in the Kremlin system of power and propaganda, are its tools. Therefore, it would be absolutely correct for the state to protect our fellow citizens, who remain under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate, from being used by Russia as an instrument of hybrid aggression” (ПЦУ 2022a). The Ukrainian Orthodox Church also protested, although only in the form of disagreement with the clearly expressed political motives of the position of Patriarch Kirill: “we express disagreement with the position of Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia regarding the war in Ukraine” (УПЦ 2022а). However, it is probably more important to mention those cases when individual representatives of both sides, through the mediation of the authorities, follow the embodiment of the Christian virtues of peace and love in practice. Their “declaration of understanding” “condemns the destructive positions of the Moscow Patriarchate, which, neglecting the Commandments of God, has turned into a “servant” of the Putin regime and blesses the Russian aggressors for bloodshed” (ETHOS 2022). Let us emphasize that such an initiative comes from the grassroots clergy, that is, it demonstrates a request from below, but the end of the war will show how functional this projection will be.
We should pay attention that in view of the high effectiveness of the religious component in the hybrid Russian-Ukrainian war, the state regulation of church-religious processes reacted to similar sentiments, appeals and certain facts of the political activity of representatives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (which are not argumentative for this research, as they go beyond the methodological framework – analysis of church documents) by the draft law “On the special status of religious organizations, the management centers of which are located in the state recognized by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine as the aggressor state” (Верховна Рада України 2017). The purpose of the law was to exclude the factor of destabilization by religious organizations, in particular, to stimulate the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to more constructive positions in the state-identity plane. And only after the Law (Закон України 2019), which obliges to indicate one’s affiliation in the title, as well as the beginning of the hot phase of the war, forced the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to resort to the already mentioned deletion of all references to the Russian Orthodox Church from its Statute.
It should be noted that the accents of the sermons of the leaders of the churches very well illustrate orientation engagement. The sermons as a form of evangelization are always full of the most relevant for the flock. In our context, this hybridity is a threat to the national future of the Ukrainian people. Thus, the sermons of the head of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine are much more transparent and clearly problematized, close to today’s relevance: “eight and a half years ago, Russia started the war, temporarily seized Crimea and part of Donbas. Exactly six months ago, a full-scale Russian aggression began, the goal of which is to destroy our very identity, to de-Ukrainize Ukraine” (ПЦУ 2022d). The formulation of the superior of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church does not always clearly describe the quality of the event, that is, they describe the fact, the general structure of the presence of the event, that “there is something! there is a problem!”, without resorting to the specifics of “what exactly is it? what is the problem?”: “We pray that the Lord will fill the hearts of all people with love, and especially those who are killing our people today” (УПЦ 2022b, 26) or “to protect our land from war, from the fact that blood is being shed on our land” (УПЦ 2022b, 5).
Discussion and conclusions
The Russian aggression in Ukraine as a new type of hybrid warfare uses all possible means of forming national identity, including religion. This war emphasizes that religion as one of these means plays both a destructive and constructive role in identity processes. The current church processes in Ukraine, as expressed in the documentary examples above, fit into the global context with the features of the instrumentalist theory of the functioning of religion in international relations, and the current instrumentalization of the church is a manifestation of the synergistic complexity of war, which combines almost all the features of hybridity: It reflects a specific way of permanently acting/influencing without obvious (aggressive) signs (as the so-called “soft power”); it acts through its own subjectivity, reflecting another subjectivity; it makes up/supplements the arsenal of tools, increasing and varying the operational environment. In the Russian ideology of the “Russian world”, Orthodoxy is both a means and a cause of war, as its instrumentality is evidenced by documents (sermons and appeals of Patriarch Kirill), and its alternative civilizational interpretation of unity not only destroys the identity of neighboring cultures, but also moves troops to foreign lands of the so-called “brotherly peoples”. To sum up, the criteria for the concept of a “national passport of the Orthodox churches” are relevant as follows:
(1) The criterion of subjectivity:
(a) establishes the legality of the main documents certifying the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church: tomos of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine as a generally accepted document in church law certifies its full self-government and independence, indicates unity with universal Orthodoxy and equality with other Orthodox churches; since the Charter of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is nominal and had a political motivation, and does not reflect a mature locality, that is, the spiritual and cultural incorporation of the church, we therefore express doubts about its legality in granting full independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church;
(b) objectifies the ambiguity/unambiguity of the norms of the Statute, which determine independence: of the five points of the “General Provisions” of the Statute of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, in which affiliation is declared, in 2 points the autocephalous status and the fact that it is part of world Orthodoxy are clearly formulated, which, in the end, is evidenced by the Diptych; of the six points of the “General Provisions” of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Statute, in which affiliation should be declared, none clearly and unequivocally indicates the status of complete independence, but rather the rights of broad autonomy (local subjectivity) are recorded;
(c) transmits the fullness of church independence both on the map of world Orthodoxy and the entire religious and spiritual space: the Orthodox Church of Ukraine received this right by taking its place in the Diptych and is undergoing the process of recognition by other local churches, which is evidenced by the possibility of its own expediency in international activities and in the intra-organizational work of the head; taking into account the norms of the Statute of the Russian Orthodox Church as a beneficiary for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and most importantly the facts of their activities, there is no need to talk about the existence of such an opportunity in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, moreover, this beneficiary status in terms of its functionality in the structural and organizational life of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is simply raider;
(d) objectifies the independence of the church as the main condition for the preservation and nurturing of the own national and cultural identity: according to the church jurisdiction, the current Ukrainian Orthodox Church is a canonical anomaly, and the correction of this depends on its self-awareness of its historical roots and inclusion in their restored potential, in the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. However, for now, we can see the opposite positions, which are synchronized with the Russian Orthodox Church and the non-recognition of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.
(2) The conciliar-legal criterion indicates not only the observance or non-observance of the tradition of choosing a superior, but primarily emphasizes the ability of the Russian Orthodox Church to keep the leadership apparatus of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under its own constant control, thus ensuring all the necessary executive functionality, first of all, in the aspect of general loyalty to the Moscow Patriarchate of millions Ukrainians. That is, there is no need to talk about independence, nor about following and confirming the ancient tradition of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. On the other hand, the fact of choosing the head of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (Local Cathedral 2018) indicates such constructive features.
(3) The criterion of openness fixes the level of
(a) intra-church trust and (b) social-church communication: the normative and actual participation of the laity, as well as the clergy of various levels in the highest level of church power of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine is the basis for the healthy democratic development of the church as a social institution, which establishes the value orientations of the community by its own example; in the regulatory and electoral acts of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, we observe signs of the selective approach to the election process of the highest church authority, and therefore the characteristics of a closed system. Ultimately, the thesis of closedness is confirmed by the inaccessibility of key regulatory documents both to the general public and to the own flock;
(c) inter-church dialogue: the documentary fact of the proposals of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine to start a dialogue at the highest church level attests to social responsibility and is placed in the rank of priority during the war without any conditions as an opportunity to build a new Orthodox church and get rid of the political and religious influence of Moscow, following the world Orthodox on the basis of equals among equals. Instead, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church refers to such a possibility as a “deepening of misunderstandings”, it is not considered a chance for reconciliation in the independent church with joining the world Orthodoxy, but as a deepening of the crisis. This can be understood as a crisis in three cases: (I) when these actions are positioned by the Russian Orthodox Church as the loss of the historical source of its own origin, that is, its mother church (Kyiv Metropolis), (II) the loss of political influence of Moscow in Ukraine through the entire Orthodox congregation (III) the loss of territories as a weakening of positions in the confrontation with the Universal throne. That is, it is a crisis only for the Russian Orthodox Church, but by no means for the Orthodox of Ukraine. So we record directly opposite positions regarding the current situation and completely different strategies regarding the future;
(d) another factor that turns the Ukrainian Orthodox Church into a closed type structure is the prohibition to create its own institutions abroad, unlike the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. In contrast to this Moscow norm of regulating social and spiritual care by the own congregation at a distance, and therefore influencing own external vision of oneself, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church has documented its intention to change everything.
(4) Democracy as a criterion illuminates functional individuality:
(a) despite a whole series of norms for the main regulatory document (Statute) of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the cited documents of the Russian Orthodox Church, the UOC still managed to change it (as of 05/27/2022) without any officially documented agreements with the Russian Orthodox Church. Since during the entire time of the hybrid confrontation (since 2014) no such intentions were recorded, and individual events rather indicate the opposite, as these changes appear as a result of the context of the war, that is, pressure from the public and power structures regarding the clear positioning of belonging, that is, it is by no means a manifestation of democratic rights of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Despite this, the documentary space of interpretation forces us to say that this initiative is very daring for the Russian Orthodox Church, and therefore it can be a real aspiration. That is: it can be both a false demonstration of independent rights – fictitious concessions to implement a plan to maintain influence, and a bold attempt to ultimately depart from the policy of the Russian Orthodox Church and follow the canonical order of the renewed Kyiv Metropolitanate. However, we record the fact of a documentary change; the Orthodox Church of Ukraine can change its Statute in general on an individual basis with the right (if necessary) to receive consultative guidance from the Ecumenical See. Democracy here consists in the presence of law and the joint search for solutions through discussions and consultations to improve the system of church governance;
(b) freedom and responsibility as markers of democracy embodied by the Orthodox Church of Ukraine in the implementation of the project of the military clergy (free and responsible choice of priests to share participation in the conditions of hostilities), which more than reflects the desire to protect and support the identity of the own people; on the other hand, due to all political and identity features, it is primarily the name, self-positioning and the Statute, similar projects implemented by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church are considered destructive.
(5) Evangelization as a criterion for our context characterizes
(a) the symbiosis of the Word of God and state policy: in the analyzed documents of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, we find the connection between the state and the church inherent in almost all autocephalous conceptions known in history – joint petitions for the creation of a local church. Apart from calls to pray for the protection of the own people and the preservation of culture, no tendency was found in the aspects of active/covert propaganda of ideological aspects of state policy; since there are documentary reasons to consider the Ukrainian Orthodox Church a part of the Russian Orthodox Church, so the politics of Moscow cannot help but be manifested in the destructive functionalities of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church: the theological conclusion regarding the ethnophilicism of Patriarch Kirill as an element of Russia’s ideology and hybrid war in Ukraine is apparent through all kinds of ambiguities in the documentary wording or the absence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church’s position at all. However, we record the documentary fact of disagreement with this policy;
(b) in this regard, the state’s decision to oblige religious communities to clearly document their identity according to the governing centers is the right way to reveal the destructive functionality of churches in hybrid warfare.
To sum up, the concept of “national passport of Orthodox churches” serves as a means of revealing their quality of identity in the facts of documentary norms (in defining documents) and their projection effect (in subordinate documents): the indicators of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine testify to constructiveness and the indicators of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to destructiveness. It is important that the concept also expresses destructiveness in its basic form, which in the practice of church life appears as a whole series of events, turning into various forms of hybridity. That is, the forms of constructiveness are presented by the dynamics of aspirations and social responsibility, and the forms of destructiveness by blocking and ideological necessity: the Orthodox Church of Ukraine is a new platform for understanding and self-reliance, while the Ukrainian Orthodox Church looks like a tool of the Russian Orthodox Church in a hybrid war.
